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Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne*
and Stacey McGavin Mohr*
The United States Supreme Court's landmark recalibration of class
certification requirements in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,1 together
with its broad approbation of class action waivers in arbitration
agreements in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,' establishes 2011 as
a watershed year in class action practice. During the year, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit only began to deal with
the ramifications of Dukes but addressed Concepcion's impact directly.
I. ENTER DUKES
Dukes' tightened the criteria for class certification in all would-be
federal class actions while confining Rule 23(b)(2) 4 class certification to
cases in which essentially only declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, joined by four other Justices,
invigorated the commonality requirement in Rule 23(a)(2)' that is
applicable to all three types of federal class actions. The Court held that
the ritual recital of common questions that is a staple of virtually every
class action complaint is insufficient to establish commonality.' To
* Partner in the firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Notre Dame (A.B., cum laude, 1978; J.D., magna cum laude, 1981). Law
clerk to the Hon. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and to the Hon. Morey L. Sear of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 2001), Duke University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2007).
Law clerk to the Hon. Karen Nelson Moore of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
6. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
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satisfy the rule, the common questions instead must have the capacity
to have common answers.' In a key passage, the Court explained:
Reciting these questions is not sufficient to obtain class certification.
Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class
members "have suffered the same injury." This does not mean merely
that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.
Title VII, for example, can be violated in many ways-by intentional
discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in
disparate impact, and by the use of these practices on the part of many
different superiors in a single company. Quite obviously, the mere
claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a
Title VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no
cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at
once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention-for
example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same
supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a
nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central
to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.'
The Court also held that class certification often involves inquiries into
the merits, as the Eleventh Circuit and most federal circuits had
gradually come to recognize over the last decade.? In a footnote, the
Court once and for all interred the argument, based on a quote from
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"othat inquiry into the merits is prohibited
"To the extent the quoted
when considering class certification."
statement goes beyond the permissibility of a merits inquiry for any
other pretrial purpose, it is the purest dictum and is contradicted by our
other cases."' 2 The fact that the requisite rigorous analysis of class
certification requirements will often "entail some overlap with the merits
of the plaintiffs underlying claim . .. cannot be helped.""3

7. Id. Linking common questions with common answers is an element of the
commonality assessment under Georgia law. Carnett's, Inc. v. Hammond, 279 Ga. 125,
129, 610 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2005).
8. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (internal citation omitted).
9. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316-20 (3d Cir.
2009); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196,
202-03 (2d Cir. 2008); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d
6, 26 (1st Cir. 2008); see generally Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir.
2008).
10. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
11. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6 (quoting Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2551.
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The Court also held, unanimously, that claims for monetary relief may
not be certified under Rule 23(bX2) if "each class member would be
entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages."" The Court
not only rejected the plaintiffs' argument that (b)(2) certification was
appropriate because their claims for backpay did not "predominate" over
their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, but also spurned the
suggestion that the relative "predominance" of various forms of relief
was the relevant question at all." The critical question, according to
the Court, is whether relief sought in a (b)(2) action is "individualized."16 The Court left open the possibility that monetary relief that
was not "individualized" might be available to a (b)(2) class."
Dukes is probably the Court's most significant class action decision
since the inception of the modern class action. The Court's searching
commonality analysis will likely recenter the focus of class certification
arguments from Rule 23(b)'8 to Rule 23(a)." The Court's analysis,
moreover, was more rigorous than the analysis of Rule 23(b)(3)'s
"predominance" and "superiority" criteria found in many cases for money
damages.2 0 Consequently, many pre-Dukes cases will now be of
questionable precedential utility. The Court's deep dive into the merits
to determine whether there were any bona fide common issues is
groundbreaking and will likely have wide ramifications beyond
employment cases for years to come.
The degree of scrutiny to which expert testimony should be subjected
at the class certification stage remains unsettled after Dukes, though the
Supreme Court rather pointedly suggested that a full Daubert"-style
evaluation is required." The Court's skepticism is in accord with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit opinion in

14. Id. at 2557.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certificationin the Age ofAggregate Proof,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
17. See id.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
20. The Eleventh Circuit's most recent detailed treatment of the superiority and
predominance analysis, which resembles in many respects the Dukes commonality analysis,
came in Sacred HeartHealth Sys., Inc. v. HumanaMilitary HealthcareServ., Inc., 601 F.3d
1159 (11th Cir. 2010), which was discussed in last year's survey. See Thomas M. Byrne &
Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class Actions, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1107,
1107-12 (2011).
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
22. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54 ("The District Court concluded that Daubert did not
apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings. We doubt
that is so . . . .") (citation omitted).
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American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen,23 which held that if an expert's
report is critical to class certification, then the district court must rule
on any Daubertchallenge to the expert's qualifications or testimony prior
to ruling on class certification.2 4 The Eleventh Circuit turned to the
issue in Sher v. Raytheon Co.25 and agreed with Allen in an unpublished 2011 opinion.26 Sher was an environmental contamination case
in which the district court certified a class of affected property owners.2 7 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court
erred by insufficiently evaluating the conflicting expert opinions
presented at the class certification stage." The district court had
acknowledged, but left unresolved, the conflicting expert testimony on
determination of aggregate diminution-in-value damages, but the
Eleventh Circuit held that "a district court must make the necessary
factual and legal inquiries and decide all relevant contested issues prior
to certification." 2 9 The court of appeals chided the district court for
having "side-stepped" the "[tlough questions" on opinion evidence.ao
The court remanded the case for further proceedings without opining on
the propriety of class certification."
The expert testimony issue is now the subject of a split among the
circuits. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Third
Circuits have held that a complete Daubertinquiry is not required at the
class certification stage, 2 at odds with the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits. The Eighth Circuit's opinion is the subject of a pending
petition for a writ of certiorari," which will test whether the Supreme
Court is ready to return so soon after Dukes to the rudiments of class
certification procedure.

23. 600 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2010).
24. Id. at 817.
25. 419 F. App'x 887 (11th Cir. 2011). The court accepted the appeal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).
26. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent,
but they may be cited as persuasive authority.").
27. 419 F. App'x at 889.
28. Id. at 890-91.
29. Id. at 891.
30. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id.
32. In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011),
petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2011) (No. 11-740); Behrend v.
Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 204 n.13 (3d Cir. 2011).
33. 80 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2011) (No. 11-740).

CLASS ACTIONS

2012]

1187

vs. ARBITRATION
Meanwhile, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,' the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts state
contract law limitations on the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 3 6 In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court ruled that
California's Discover Bank" rule, which classified most arbitration
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable, stood as an obstacle
to a congressional purpose and was therefore preempted by the FAA."
Discover Bank interfered with the purpose of the FAA by essentially
allowing any party to a consumer contract to demand a right to class
arbitration as a prerequisite to enforcement of an arbitration provision.3 ' The Court stated that "[riequiring the availability of classwide
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and
thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."4 0
The Eleventh Circuit's first opportunity to apply Concepeion came in
Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,' which dealt with the validity under
2
Florida law of the same arbitration agreement at issue in Concepcion."
Prior to the decision in Concepcion, the district court in Cruz had
granted defendant AT&T Mobility LLC's motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration based on the arbitration agreement contained in AT&T's
consumer contracts. The district court upheld the arbitration agreement
after concluding that Florida law did not create a blanket prohibition on
class action waivers and finding that the specific agreement at issue
would preserve consumers' statutory remedies and right to attorneys'
fees. Concepcion was decided while the plaintiffs' appeal was pending.4 3
Although the Eleventh Circuit discussed Florida law on the validity
of class action waivers, it did not decide whether such a waiver would be
allowed under Florida law." Applying Concepcion, the court instead
concluded that, to the extent the arbitration provision would be
II.

CLASS ACTIONS

34. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
35. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
36. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756.
37. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
38. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
39. Id. at 1750.
40. Id. at 1748.
41. 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
Stanley Marcus.
42. See id. at 1207.
43. Id. at 1206-07.
44. Id. at 1213 n.12.
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unconscionable under Florida law, Florida law would be preempted by
the FAA." After reviewing Concepcion, the court rejected the argument that the class action waiver was unenforceable because it would
exculpate AT&T from liability under state law and defeat the remedial
46
purpose of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act:
However, the Court in Concepcion specifically rejected this public
policy argument, which was expressly made by the dissent in that case:
"The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system.
But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the
FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons." Thus, in light of
Concepcion, state rules mandating the availability of class arbitration
based on generalizable characteristics of consumer protection
claims-including that the claims "predictably involve small amounts of
damages," that the company's deceptive practices may be replicated
across "large numbers of consumers," and that many potential claims
may go unprosecuted unless they may be brought as a class-are
preempted by the FAA, even if they may be "desirable.""
The court went on to explain that "to the extent that Florida law would
be sympathetic to the Plaintiffs' arguments here, and would invalidate
the class waiver simply because the claims are of small value, the
potential claims are numerous, and many consumers might not know
about or pursue their potential claims absent class procedures," such a
state policy would be preempted by the FAA.1
The court next addressed two attempts by the plaintiffs to distinguish
Concepcion. First, the court quickly dispensed with the argument that
Concepcion is concerned only with state laws that impose nonconsensual
class arbitrationon parties, as opposed to litigation required here under
the agreement's "blow-up" provision, which would invalidate the
arbitration agreement if the class-action waiver were inoperative."
The court rejected the incongruous proposition that the FAA would be
offended by imposing non-consensual class procedures on arbitration but
not by the elimination of arbitration altogether.o Further, the prospect
of non-consensual class arbitration was not present in Concepcion, as it
was already prohibited under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds

45. Id. at 1207.
46. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-501.213 (2011), available at http://www.leg.state.fl.us/stat
utes/.
47. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1212 (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 1212-13.

49. Id. at 1213-14.
50. Id.
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International Corp.," and the arbitration agreement contained the
same blow-up provision.52
The court spent considerably more time addressing the plaintiffs'
3
argument based on differences between Florida and California law.
Unlike California's Discover Bank rule, the plaintiffs argued, Florida law
does not invalidate class waivers in a generic category of cases but
instead requires evidentiary proof regarding the ability of parties to
vindicate their statutory rights in arbitration under the specific
provision at issue.54 Here, the plaintiffs had presented evidence in the
form of affidavits from three Florida consumer law attorneys who
attested that they would not represent consumers in individual claims
against AT&T. This evidence, however, only substantiated the same
public policy arguments rejected in Concepcion." Even the rule
advocated by the plaintiffs would preserve mandatory class actions for
all "small but numerous" consumer class actions-a rule that, if adopted,
would be preempted by the FAA."
The Eleventh Circuit did leave open one major question: whether
Concepcion allows for "the possibility that in some cases, an arbitration
agreement may be invalidated on public policy grounds where it
effectively prevents the claimant from vindicating her statutory cause of
action,"5 a principle set out by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc." and Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.5 ' The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that it need not address the application of the vindication principle
because the Supreme Court examined the same arbitration provision in
Concepcion "and concluded that it did not produce such a result."
Although Cruz seems to indicate that the Eleventh Circuit will robustly
apply Concepcion to enforce arbitration agreements,6 1the import of Cruz

51. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
52. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1213-14.
53. Id. at 1214.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1214-15.
57. Id. at 1215.
58. 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985).
59. 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000).
60. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1215.
61. The impact of Concepeion may be illustrated by a comparison of Cruz with a preConcepcion opinion, also authored by Judge Marcus, that subsequently was vacated by the
Supreme Court and remanded in light of Concepcion, Gordon v. Branch Banking & Trust,
419 F. App'x 920 (11th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 577 (Nov. 14, 2011). In
Gordon, the court concluded that a class-action waiver in a bank's consumer contract was
unconscionable under Georgia law because arbitration would not provide a mechanism for
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may be somewhat diluted by the fact that the provision at issue was
identical to the Concepcion provision, potentially leaving open questions
as to how the court may treat arbitration agreements with fewer
consumer-friendly provisions. The enforcement of class-action waivers
in arbitration agreements is likely to be heavily litigated in the coming
year as plaintiffs probe Concepcion for limits.
The Eleventh Circuit offered still more latitude to parties seeking to
enforce arbitration agreements in Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.62
The district court held that SunTrust had waived any contractual right
to arbitrate the claims brought by Krinsk because it participated in the
litigation for nine months prior to requesting that the case be submitted
to arbitration. 63 Krinsk, a ninety-two-year-old woman, claimed that
SunTrust had improperly suspended her home equity line of credit
account as well as those of other Florida homeowners who had obtained
similar accounts. SunTrust had requested updated financial information
from the customers, which Krinsk contended was used as a pretext to
suspend credit access to allow SunTrust to shore up its capital re6
serves."
Krinsk's claims included breach of contract, deceit, breach of
fiduciary duty, violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act," and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." SunTrust moved
to dismiss the case and proceeded with the discovery planning process.
SunTrust's motion to dismiss was granted in part by the district court.
When Krinsk amended her complaint in response to the dismissal order,
she enlarged the alleged class significantly. SunTrust answered the
complaint and then moved to compel arbitration."
On review, the Eleventh Circuit explained that a party may waive a
right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right in a way that

the plaintiff to recoup arbitration costs, making it unlikely that prospective plaintiffs would
be able to secure adequate representation. Id. at 923. The court distinguished its prior
decision in Cappuccittiv. DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2010), on the basis that
the plaintiff in that case was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs by statute. Gordon, 419
F. App'x at 924-25. After the Supreme Court's remand, the Eleventh Circuit remanded
Gordon to the district court for further proceedings in light of Concepcion. Gordon v.
Branch Banking & Trust, No. 09-15399, 2012 WL 265938 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2012). If
Gordon returns to the Eleventh Circuit, it could present an opportunity for the court to
further explore the contours of Concepcion.
62. 654 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). The court's opinion was authored by Judge
Gerald B. Tjoflat. Id. at 1196.
63. Id. at 1200. See S & H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514
(11th Cir. 1990) and its progeny for the circuit's law on arbitration waivers.
64. Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1197.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(r) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
66. Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1198.
67. Id. at 1198-99.
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is prejudicial to the other party." SunTrust argued on appeal that,
even if it had initially waived arbitration by pursuing judicial process,
the filing of the amended complaint had revived its right to arbitrate
under the agreement with Krinsk. The court characterized the issue as
one of first impression." The court began with the premise that an
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and becomes the
operative pleading and that a defendant is allowed to "plead anew" in
response to an amended complaint." Citing authority from other
circuits, the court postulated that a defendant is permitted to rescind its
earlier waiver of arbitration "only if it is shown that the amended
complaint unexpectedly changes the scope or theory of the plaintiffs
claims."" The court noted that minor changes in an original complaint
would not trigger the renewed right to seek arbitration.7 2 But the court
deemed the amendment to Krinsk's complaint to expand greatly the
potential scope of the litigation by eliminating the original class
definition's limits on class members' age and reasons for credit suspensions and by expanding the class period from a matter of months to more
than three years. 3 The court saw this as a "vast augmentation of the
putative class."7 The court termed Krinsk's amendment as unforeseeable to SunTrust and held that allowing SunTrust to amend was a
matter of "plain fairness."
Krinsk offers a narrow escape hatch to class action defendants who
passed on their arbitration rights when the case law left open the risk
of class arbitration, feared by many defendants because of limited
appellate rights.76 Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen have largely abated
that risk, leaving some defendants in pending class litigation wistful
about what might have been if they had invoked arbitration earlier.
Not every 2011 arbitration decision involving class actions, however,
favored the party seeking arbitration. In Lawson v. Life of the South
Insurance Co.," an insurer that issued credit life insurance covering a

68. Id. at 1200 (citing Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (11th
Cir. 2002)).
69. Id. at 1202.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1203.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1204.
75. Id.
76. The risk of class arbitration came to prominence after the divided decision in Green
Tree FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), which now seems limited to its facts.
77. 648 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2011). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
Ed Carnes, with a concurring opinion by Judge William H. Pryor, Jr.
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credit sale of a motor vehicle sought to enforce the arbitration provision
found in the finance agreement entered into between the dealership and
the buyers. The insurer was not a party to that agreement, which
financed the credit life insurance premium. The finance agreement's
arbitration provision included a bar on class arbitration.
The Lawsons filed a nationwide class action in Georgia state court
against the insurer, which, under the Class Action Fairness Act,"
removed the case successfully to federal district court.o The insurer
argued that it was entitled to invoke the finance agreement's arbitration
provision-even though it was not a party to that agreement-either
because it was a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration provision or
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments." The court noted
that the finance agreement did not show on its face an intent to allow
anyone other than the buyers, the car dealership, and the bank that
acquired the finance contract to arbitrate a dispute.82 The court held
that an intention to benefit a third party on the face of the contract was
required under Georgia law to assert third-party beneficiary rights."
Further, the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not available to the
insurer to compel arbitration." As the court gauged it, "That is not a
bad argument, but it is not a good enough one to prevail." The court
noted that Georgia courts have applied equitable estoppel to allow nonsignatories to arbitration agreements to assert their rights against
signatories." But the court reasoned that "[ulnder Georgia law, a
plaintiff's claims must directly, not just indirectly, be based on the
contract containing the arbitration clause in order for equitable estoppel
to compel arbitration of those claims."" The court concluded that the
finance agreement was not the legal basis for the claims against the
insurance company." Those claims instead were predicated on the
refund of the unearned insurance premium upon early repayment of the
insured debt, which was required under the credit life insurance policy

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1168-69.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (2006).
Lawson, 648 F.3d at 1170.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1171-72.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1173.
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and applicable insurance law." The court rejected the argument that
the "but-for" relationship between the underlying transaction and the
90
credit insurance policy alone was enough to invoke equitable estoppel.
The court pointed out that Georgia law prohibited an insurer from
including an arbitration clause in any of its insurance contracts, though
exactly how this provision figured in the majority's reasoning was
unexplained." Concurring separately, Judge Pryor opined that the
insurer's equitable estoppel argument might just be meritorious under
Georgia law but concluded that Georgia law's prohibition of mandatory
arbitration of insurance disputes was controlling.92
In yet another decision on the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, the Eleventh Circuit examined the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction over freestanding petitions to compel arbitration brought
under section 4 of the FAA." Community State Bank v. Strong94
involved an action brought by a Georgia payday lender, along with its
affiliates, and a South Dakota bank, seeking to compel arbitration of a
borrower's claims arising out of his loan transaction, based on an
agreement to arbitrate contained in the loan documents. The case has
a somewhat convoluted procedural history, starting with a state court
class action and culminating in multiple trips to the Eleventh Circuit
panel and the en banc court. The plaintiff originally filed a putative
class action in Georgia state court alleging violations of the Georgia
usury statute and other Georgia laws. To avoid federal jurisdiction, the
plaintiff named as defendants only the Georgia payday lender affiliates
and not the South Dakota bank. After the Georgia defendants and the
bank served the plaintiff with a notice of intent to arbitrate, which the
plaintiff rejected, the Georgia defendants removed the state-court action
to federal court. The Georgia defendants, together with the bank, then

89. Id.
90. Id. at 1174-75.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1175-78 (Pryor, J., concurring).
93. Community State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2011); 9 U.S.C.
§ 4 (2006). Section 4 provides in part that
[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
94. 651 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2011). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
Stanley Marcus. Id. at 1246.
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filed a separate petition under § 4 seeking to compel arbitration.95 The
petition based federal jurisdiction on the complete preemption doctrine,
96
arguing that section 27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
The district court,
completely preempted the state-law claims."
however, disagreed, remanding the state-court action and dismissing the
separate § 4 action for lack of jurisdiction."
The case then began its trek through the Eleventh Circuit, which first
reversed the dismissal of the petition, concluding that "looking through
the § 4 arbitration petition to the underlying controversy," the plaintiff
"could have filed a coercive action arising under federal law, and
therefore the district court had federal jurisdiction over the petition to
compel arbitration."" The court subsequently granted rehearing en
banc,'00 but before an en banc decision was issued, review was stayed
pending the Supreme Court's decision in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 10
which raised substantially similar jurisdictional issues under § 4.102
After Vaden was decided, the case was remanded to the original panel
for further consideration.'0 o Meanwhile, things had been progressing
in the state-court action. After the Georgia defendants failed to comply
with the state court's discovery orders, the state court sanctioned the
defendants by striking their arbitration defenses,'0 4 leaving the
Georgia defendants in a much different position than the South Dakota
bank.
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit first considered the position of the
bank and the effect of Vaden on the prior panel decision.10 5 The court

95. Id. at 1248-50.
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2006). The relevant portion of § 27(a) provides as follows:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository
institutions . .. with respect to interest rates, if the applicable rate prescribed in
this subsection exceeds the rate such State bank. . . would be permitted to charge
in the absence of this subsection, such State bank ... may, notwithstanding any
State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this
section, . . . charge on any loan . . . interest at a rate of not more than 1 per

centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at
the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State bank
... is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . .. whichever may

be
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

greater.
Strong, 651 F.3d at 1250-51.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 508 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2007).
556 U.S. 49 (2009).
Id. at 57-58.
Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 565 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2009).
Strong, 651 F.3d at 1262.
Id. at 1253.
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concluded that Vaden approved the "look through" approach previously
used by the court for evaluating subject matter jurisdiction over a § 4
petition."o' In Vaden, litigation already had been filed between the
same parties to the § 4 petition. The Supreme Court concluded that,
where the parties have already framed the claims by filing underlying
litigation, the actual complaint must be considered as opposed to
hypothetical claims that might have been made.1o' Vaden therefore
did not address to what a court must "look through" where there has not
yet been litigation filed involving the parties to the petition. 10 Based
in large part on the opinion of Justice Roberts, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, the Eleventh Circuit held that, where a complaint has
not yet been filed against the party filing the § 4 petition, the court must
look through the petition to hypothetical claims that could be brought in
a coercive action against the petitioner."o' To examine the "whole
controversy" between the parties, the court should examine "prelitigation or extra-legal communications between the parties" to reach
the nature of the factual dispute."0 Here, based on the facts as
revealed through the § 4 petition and exhibits-the state-court complaint,
the arbitration demand, and the response thereto-the court concluded
that the plaintiff would have non-frivolous claims against the bank
under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) statute,' providing subject-matter jurisdiction over the bank's

petition.112
The court, however, found no subject matter jurisdiction over the
petition as to the Georgia payday lender defendants.113 Applying
settled principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the court
concluded that the state court's striking of the arbitration defense as a
discovery sanction precluded the Georgia defendants from relitigating
the issue of the arbitration agreement's enforceability."'

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1256 & n.11.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
Strong, 651 F.3d at 1257-61.
See id. at 1271.
Id. at 1264-71.
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III. DEFINING THE CLASS
The year also saw several decisions considering issues concerning class
certification and class settlements. In Fitzpatrick v. General Mills,
Inc.,115 the Eleventh Circuit considered an interlocutory appeal of the
certification of a Rule 23(bX3)" class in an action brought under the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA)."' In a
somewhat unusual turn, the court approved of the district court's
predominance analysis but vacated and remanded with instructions to
alter the class definition, concluding that "the class as certified is not
consistent with the analysis of the law performed by the district
17 8
court."
The plaintiff in Fitzpatrickbrought claims under the FDUTPA and for
breach of warranty, alleging that General Mills and a subsidiary made
false and misleading claims about the digestive health benefits ofYoPlus
yogurt.119 The district court certified a class as to the FDUTPA claims,
defined as "all persons who purchased YoPlus in the State of Florida to
obtain its claimed digestive health benefit."' 20 On appeal, the defendants argued that common issues did not predominate and that the
district court abused its discretion in defining the class because the
definition required individualized fact-finding.''
The court of appeals agreed with the district court's finding that
common issues would predominate under Rule 23(b)(2),1 2 in part
because the FDUTPA does not require a showing of actual reliance by
each plaintiff, but only a showing that the deceptive conduct would
deceive an objectively reasonable consumer, which could be shown by
common proof.12 The court concluded, however, that the order could
115. 635 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2011). The opinion of the court was authored by Senior
Judge Peter T. Fay. Id. at 1280.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
117. Fitzpatrick, 635 F.3d at 1280; FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-501.213 (2011), availableat
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/.
118. Fitzpatrick, 635 F.3d at 1281.
119. Id. at 1280-81.
120. Id. at 1282 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 1280-81.
122. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2).
123. Fitzpatrick, 635 F.3d at 1282-83. The court revisited this aspect of Fitzpatrick in
another putative class action brought under the FDUTPA, coming to a different conclusion
on the predominance issue. In Webber v. Esquire Deposition Services, LLC, 439 F. App'x
849 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), the court considered the district court's refusal to certify
under Rule 23(bX3) claims against court-reporting firms alleging that the firms' billing
practices violated the FDUTPA and unjustly enriched the firms. Although, as explained
in Fitzpatrick,the FDUTPA does not require individualized proof of subjective reliance, the
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not stand because the district court's class definition was inconsistent
with this analysis.124 The court specifically took issue with the class
definition's requirement that class members have purchased YoPlus "to
obtain its claimed digestive health benefit," which would "take[] into
5
The
account individual reliance on the digestive health claims."'
court vacated and remanded, essentially instructing the district court to
redefine the class as "all persons who purchased YoPlus in the State of
Florida."12 6 On remand, the district court did just that, defining the
class as "all persons who purchased Yo-Plus in the State of Florida until
the date notice is first provided to the class, "127 and did not revisit its
predominance analysis under the new definition. The defendants were
therefore left with a broader class than that originally certified, one
likely to include class members who were not damaged by the allegedly
misleading claims.
IV.

CLASS SETTLEMENTS

The Eleventh Circuit also explored issues regarding the approval and
preclusive effect of a class action settlement in a trio of entangled
decisions arising from one underlying action, Faught v. American Home
Shield Corp.1 28 Faught was a nationwide consumer class action
alleging that American Home Shield (AHS), a seller and administrator
of service contracts for home systems and appliances, wrongfully denied
customers' repair and replacement claims.' 2 9 Before the Faughts filed
their action in the Northern District of Alabama, however, a nationwide
class action based on substantially identical claims had been brought in
3
A
California state court by another set of plaintiffs, the Edlesons."'
settlement was reached in the Edleson action, which gave the class

district court did not abuse its discretion given the individualized factual and legal issues
inherent in the "differences in the circumstances under which putative class members
purchased transcripts from the court-reporting firms." Webber, 439 F. App'x at 851. As
to the unjust enrichment claims, "'common questions will rarely, if ever, predominate' in
an unjust enrichment claim." Id. (quoting Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1274
(11th Cir. 2009)).
124. Fitzpatrick, 635 F.3d at 1283.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 1283 n.1.
127. Order at 2, Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 0:09-cv-60412-PCH (S.D. Fla. Dec.
2, 2011), ECF No. 181 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp. (FaughtI), 660 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp. (FaughtII), 444 F. App'x 445 (11th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam); Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp. (FaughtIII), Nos. 10-12496, 10-12534, 1012536, 2011 WL 7118832 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2011) (Dubina, C.J.).
129. Faught I, 660 F.3d at 1290.
130. See FaughtIII, 2011 WL 7118832, at *1-2.
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members the right to resubmit their claims to a "Review Desk" run by
1
AHS but provided no specific standards for adjudicating the claims."'
After the California court refused to approve the Edleson settlement,
AHS reached a settlement with the Faughts, which included a similar
Review Desk process but provided more specific guidelines for claimshandling and litigation incentives to ensure that AHS treated claimants
fairly."' The Alabama district court issued a final judgment approving the settlement and permanently enjoining "[tihe Named Plaintiffs,
all Class Members, their counsel and anyone claiming through or for the
benefit of any of them" from commencing, continuing or otherwise
participating in a suit asserting released claims against AHS.'as The
appeals that followed involved both claims by objectors to the settlement
and attempts by the Edlesons, who opted out of the Faught settlement,
to revive their class claims in the California action.' 34
After the settlement was approved, AHS made various attempts to
prevent the Edlesons from continuing their action. Although the
Edlesons initially represented to the Alabama district court that they
would pursue their claims only on an individual basis, they then filed an
amended complaint in California that asserted new but related causes
of action purportedly brought on a class basis.3 " AHS then moved the
district court for a permanent injunction against the Edlesons, arguing
that the relief they sought would interfere with the court's jurisdiction
and would be incompatible with the business practice changes agreed to
in the Faught settlement."' After a hearing, the district court granted
the motion, enjoining the Edlesons from pursuing "any and all representative aspects" of their action, including all requests for injunctive relief,
but allowing them to pursue "purely individual claims for monetary
relief.""' The Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal, not because the
Edlesons had not violated the injunction in the final judgment, but
because "[tihe district court abused its discretion by entering an
injunction to enforce a judgment that already included an injunction
entered under the All Writs Act."'"' The court reiterated the longstanding rule that "injunctions are enforced through the district court's

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Faught I, 660 F.3d at 1291 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1291-92.
Id. at 1292 (internal quotation marks omittted).
Id.
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civil contempt power""' and instructed that AHS "should have moved
the district court for an order to show cause why the Edlesons should not
be held in contempt for violating the injunction against the prosecution
of released claims."o
The Eleventh Circuit did, however, reaffirm the broad discretion of
district courts in the approval of settlement terms. In Faught II and
FaughtIII, the court considered appeals by objectors to various aspects
of the approved settlement and affirmed the settlement in both
cases. 4 1 While Faught II quickly disposed of an appeal by one set of
objectors, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the objectors' request for an award of attorneys' fees and
costs,1 42 Faught III took a closer look at the objections made by four
sets of objectors, one of which was represented by the same counsel as
the Edlesons.143 The objections considered in Faught III fell into three
categories: reasonableness of the class notice; fairness of the settlement;
and reasonableness of the attorneys' fees awarded to class counsel. 44
Each category was based at least in part on the theory that the approved
settlement was substantially similar to the Edleson settlement, a
contention repeatedly rejected by the court.145
As to notice, the court first rejected the objectors' contention that the
notice should have informed class members of the reasons the Edleson
settlement had been rejected:146

139. Id. at 1293 (quoting Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823,829
(11th Cir. 2010)). Thomas, which also addressed the preclusive effect of a class settlement,
is discussed in last year's survey. See Byrne & Mohr, supra note 20, at 1120-22 &
n.128. This year the court also revisited the preclusive effects of a prior class action in
Taylor v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 441 F. App'x 664 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Last
year's survey reviewed the court's decision in Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d
1324 (11th Cir. 2010), which considered the preclusive effect of the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), a decades-old tobacco
case in which that court had decertified the class but left standing certain factual findings
to be used offensively by class members, on individual actions subsequently filed by class
members. See Byrne & Mohr, supra note 20, at 1122-24. This year, Taylor considered the
argument of an individual plaintiff, who was not an Engle class member, that Engle's res
judicata effect tolled the applicable statute of limitations. 441 F. App'x at 665-66. The
court rejected this argument in a short per curiam opinion, concluding that Florida's twoyear statute of limitations for wrongful death actions precluded the plaintiffs claims. Id.
140. Faught1, 660 F.3d at 1293.
141. Faught II, 444 F. App'x at 446; Faught III, 2011 WL 7118832 at *1.
142. 444 F. App'x at 446.
143. 2011 WL 7118832 at *1.
144. Id. at *3.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *5.
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[Wihile it would be easy to point to any number of additional data
points that could have been included in the notice, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
reference to the Edleson agreement and the other information [in the
notice] provided reasonable notice under the circumstances.' 47
Considering the fairness of the settlement terms themselves, the court
performed a detailed comparison of the two settlements, pointing to
several additional provisions of the Faught settlement making it fairer
than the Edleson settlement, such as requiring qualifications for Review
Desk personnel, specific guidelines for claims adjudication, and
"litigation kickers" giving AHS an incentive to properly settle claims
through the Review Desk process.' 8 The court also rejected the
argument that the settlement would strip class members of their class
rights under various state consumer protection laws-an argument
echoing those made by plaintiffs in Concepcion,'49 Cruz,150 and similar cases-noting that all class members were free to opt out and "still
have the option of forgoing the Review Desk and filing an individual suit
under their state consumer protections statutes."15 ' Further, if class
members did submit the claims to the Review Desk, they could receive
the full value of their claims, not "mere pennies on the dollar."1 52 The
court similarly affirmed the attorneys' fees award, which consisted of a
$1.5 million lump sum plus 25% of the monetary compensation received
by class members through the Review Desk process."' The court
approved of the district court's finding that, because 25% is generally
accepted as reasonable in a common fund case, it should also be
reasonable here.'54 As to the additional $1.5 million lump sum, the
court agreed that this amount could reasonably be considered compensation for the value added to the settlement through changes to AHS's
business practices and establishment of the "state of the art" Review
Desk, non-monetary benefits to which the 25% was not applied."'
The Faught decisions reaffirm settled principles of the Eleventh
Circuit regarding approval of settlements. The court has seldom been
inclined to micromanage fee awards in settled cases. When it comes to

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at *5-7.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011).
Faught III, 2011 WL 7118832 at *7.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *8-9.
Id.
Id.
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injunctions that apply to state-court proceedings, however, the
court-animated by federalism concerns-will demand strict adherence to
established procedures."

156. Similar federalism concerns underlie the Supreme Court's recent decision in Smith
v. Bayer Corp., in which the Court held that a federal district court's injunction of a state
court from considering a request for class certification exceeded the district court's
authority under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (2006). 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). The Court concluded that the district court's denial
of a similar class-certification request by a different plaintiff did not preclude other
plaintiffs from proceeding in state court. Id. It was unclear whether the certification
issues in the state court were the same, and the state plaintiffs were neither parties to the
federal suit nor covered by any exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion. Id.
Smith is in accord with the Eleventh Circuit's earlier decision in In re Bayshore Ford
Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2006), which was in conflict with the view of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, now overruled by
Smith. See Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2375 & n.4 (discussing circuit split). The year did,
however, see the Eleventh Circuit affirm a district court's enjoining of a state-court action
under the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the AIA. Winchester v. Florida
Farm Bureau Equities Inc., 427 F. App'x 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Winchester, the court concluded that the exception applied where,
pursuant to its final judgment retaining jurisdiction to enforce a class settlement
agreement, the district court enjoined a state-court action filed by the plaintiffs against the
same corporate defendants for alleged breaches of the settlement agreement. Id. at 837.

